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How the Andean Pact
Transformed Itself into a
Friend of Foreign Enterprise
On September 5, 1995, the presidents of the five countries that make up the
Andean Pact (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) met in Quito,
the Ecuadorean capital, and issued a plan of action to consolidate and further
expand reform efforts within the Andean Pact that had been initiated at the start
of the 1990s.' The Quito meeting was followed on March 9-10, 1996, by a
presidential summit in Trujillo, Peru, attended by four Andean Pact presidents
(Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera sent a representative instead because he
was required to attend to an economic crisis at home), as well as the president
of Panama. In addition to agreeing to change the name of the Andean Pact to
the Andean Community, the Andean presidents also adopted a Protocol Modifying
the Cartagena Agreement and left open the possibility of future accession by
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Panama.2 These reforms are intended to cleanse the Andean Pact of legal norms
and an institutional framework premised on now-discredited import-substitution
economic policies prevalent in Latin America during the Pact's founding in 1969.
The reforms adopted over the past five years have already helped to transform
the Andean Pact into one of the most innovative economic integration projects
in South America today. In some respects, the Andean Pact is even ahead of
MERCOSUR in providing communitarian norms for such things as the adequate
protection of intellectual property rights.3
Before discussing the most recent proposals to reform the Andean Pact, it is
important to review briefly the history of the Andean integration process and
examine its current legal framework and institutions. Otherwise, it is impossible
to comprehend fully the extent to which the Andean Pact has transformed itself
from an integration project that was, at best, indifferent to foreign investment
to one that now actively welcomes it.
I. The Andean Pact's Original Legal Framework
On May 26, 1969, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru signed the
Cartagena Agreement, which formally brought the Andean Pact into existence.4
Venezuela joined later, in 1973. The Andean Pact was a direct response to the
frustration felt by many of the Andean countries to the shortcomings of the Latin
American Free Trade Area (ALALC), an economic integration program that
began in 1960 and included all of the Spanish-speaking republics of South America
plus Brazil and Mexico. 5 In particular, many believed that ALALC was benefiting
only the bigger and more industrialized member states such as Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico to the detriment of the smaller, less-industrialized members.6
The goal of the Andean Pact countries, when they signed the Cartagena
2. Despite the exhortations of the Andean presidents that the Trujillo Protocol Modifying the
Cartagena Agreement be ratified by mid-May of 1996, none of the legislatures in any of the five
Andean Pact countries has yet done so.
3. MERCOSUR is the Spanish acronym for Common Market of the South, the customs union
that officially came into existence on January 1, 1995, and whose membership consists of Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. An article on the MERCOSUR project by this author was published
in 28 INT'L LAW. 439 (1994).
4. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 [hereinafter
Cartagena Agreement].
5. See Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Free Trade Association, Feb.
18, 1960, 2 M.I.G.O. 1575.The Latin American Free Trade Association or ALALC (as it was better
known by its Spanish and Portuguese acronym) was later replaced by the current Latin American
Integration Association (or ALADI) in 1980. See Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin Ameri-
can Integration Association, Aug. 12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 (1981).
6. For a more thorough analysis of the reasons that led to the creation of the Andean Pact and
a detailed discussion of the Pact's early history, see A. PUYANA DE PALACIOS, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
AMONG UNEQUAL PARTNERS: THE CASE OF THE ANDEAN GROUP (1982).
VOL. 30, NO. 4
ANDEAN PACT 813
Agreement in 1969, was to establish a customs union.7 To achieve this goal, the
Cartagena Agreement provided for, inter alia, the gradual elimination of all tariff
barriers and quantitative restrictions on goods native to and traded within the
Andean region so as to be completely eliminated by December 31, 1980.8 Bolivia
and Ecuador were given more time to eliminate their import restrictions in recog-
nition of their lesser-developed status. 9 Special lists of goods exempt from the
general tariff reduction schedule were also permitted for all five countries, but
only until 1985.'0 The Cartagena Agreement further called for the establishment
of a Common External Tariff (CET) by December 31, 1980, on all goods imported
from all non-Andean countries that did not enjoy a preexisting preferential tariff
treatment under ALALC. "
Articles 32 and 33 of the Cartagena Agreement called for the establishment
of so-called sectoral industrial development programs. Under these programs,
various member countries of the Andean Pact would be involved in the production
of a component of a manufactured good not already produced within the Andean
countries that, when fully completed, would then be traded among the Andean
Pact states free of tariffs and import restrictions. Products not manufactured
within the subregion and not reserved for the sectoral industrial development
programs were to be produced in new factories to be set up in Bolivia and Ecuador
and traded within the Andean Pact free of tariffs and import quotas. 12 Both of
these industrial development programs had the overtly political aim of garnering
more support for the integration process among the various Andean states by
promoting balanced regional growth rather than permitting market forces (as had
been the case with ALALC) to decide where the new industries would be located. 13
In an attempt to control the perceived pernicious effects of foreign investment,
article 27 of the Cartagena Agreement called for the creation of a common Andean
Pact policy vis-a-vis foreign investment, trademarks, patents, and licenses. In
response, the relevant Andean Pact institutional body adopted Decision No. 24
in 1976.14 Decision 24 forbade foreign investment in activities already being
7. In a customs union, all goods native to the participating countries are traded amongst them
tariff-free while all goods imported from outside the union are charged a uniform duty by all the
member states. A customs union is a more advanced form of economic integration than a free trade
area (FTA) (in which all the member states exchange goods native to the FTA tariff-free but continue
to charge their own particular tariff rates on goods imported from outside the FTA) but is less
advanced than a common market (which adds to the customs union concept the free movement of
labor, capital, and services among the member states).
8. See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 4, art. 45.
9. See id. art. 46.
10. See id. art. 55.
11. See id. art. 61.
12. See id.
13. Avery & Cochrane, Innovation in Latin American Regionalism: The Andean Common Market,
27 INT'L ORG. 181, 193 (Spring 1973).
14. Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses,
and Royalties, Nov. 30, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 138 (1977).
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carried out by enterprises from the Andean countries and prohibited foreigners
from buying stock in Andean firms. Absent a rule by an individual member state
permitting a higher amount, Decision 24 set 20 percent as the maximum amount
of annual profits a foreign corporation could repatriate abroad. Decision 24 also
required any foreign company not already operating within the Andean subregion
as of January 1, 1974, to sell at least 51 percent of its shares to Andean Pact
nationals to be considered a "mixed company" and therefore eligible to take
advantage of the Pact's intraregional free trade scheme. Finally, in an attempt
to prevent foreign controlled monopolies and restrictions on technology transfer,
Decision 24 prohibited member states from granting licensing contracts to foreign
companies that contained restrictive noncompetition clauses.
H. The Institutions of the Andean Pact
The two original Andean Pact institutions created under the Cartagena
Agreement were the Commission and the Junta. The Commission is the highest
body of the Pact, and each member state is represented by one representative
who is entitled to one vote. 5 The Commission, which usually meets in Lima,
Peru, issues decisions furthering the Andean Pact's objectives; additionally, it
appoints and removes Junta members and approves or rejects proposals made
by the Junta. 16 In general, only a two-thirds affirmative vote is needed to approve
most decisions (abstentions counting as affirmative votes). ' 7 The decisions of the
Commission theoretically have direct applicability and do not require ratification
by each member state's national legislature before they become the law of the
land in that country."
The Junta is the technical and administrative branch of the Andean Pact and
is made up of three members chosen by the Commission for three-year terms. ' 9
The main function of the Junta, which is headquartered in Lima, is to ensure
implementation of Commission decisions. For this purpose, the Junta is author-
ized to issue resolutions (which require a unanimous affirmative vote) that are
theoretically binding upon all the member states. The Junta also presents proposals
to the Commission that it feels, if adopted, would facilitate or accelerate the
objectives of the Andean integration process. 20 Articles 19 through 22 of the
15. See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 4, art. 6.
16. See id. art. 7.
17. See id. art. 11.
18. See, e.g., J.G. Andueza, La Aplicaci6n Directa del Ordenamiento Jur[dico del Acuerdo de
Cartagena, in EL TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICIA DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA (1985). This concept of
direct applicability is similar to the situation that exists with respect to regulations issued by the
Council of the European Union. The major difference between the European Union and the Andean
Pact is, however, that direct applicability has been widely accepted in the European Union while it
has historically been honored more in the breach than in practice in the Andean context.
19. See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 4, art. 13.
20. See id. art. 15.
VOL. 30, NO. 4
ANDEAN PACT 815
Cartagena Agreement established various consultative committees to advise the
Junta in matters such as monetary and exchange policy, finance, fiscal policy,
foreign trade, and tourism.
In May of 1979 a treaty creating the Tribunal of Justice of the Cartagena
Agreement was signed and Quito was designated to be the permanent seat of the
court. 2' The court, which did not actually begin to function until 1984, is made
up of five judges (one from each of the five Andean Pact countries). The court
has the authority to: (1) nullify decisions made by the Commission or resolutions
issued by the Junta because they are not in keeping with the general legal norms
established under the Cartagena Agreement; (2) determine whether a member
state is in compliance with its Andean Pact obligations; and (3) offer advisory
opinions to the courts of the individual member states to ensure the uniform
application of the Andean Pact in all the member states.22 Individuals affected
by a decision or resolution that runs contrary to the norms of the Treaty of
Cartagena may, in theory, bring an action in the Tribunal on their own (although,
currently, only a State Party or the Junta may bring an action against a member
state for noncompliance with Andean Pact norms). Judgments of the Tribunal
of Justice are legally binding on the member states and a refusal to adhere to
the court's holdings permits the complaining member states to take appropriate
retaliatory measures, such as restricting or suspending the preferential tariff treat-
ment granted to the noncooperative state under the Cartagena Agreement.
In order to facilitate intraregional trade, investment, and fund development
projects within the Andean subregion, the Andean Development Corporation
(CAF), headquartered in Caracas, Venezuela, was formed in 1970. The Sistema
Andino de Financiamiento al Comercio (SAFICO), which operates under the
CAF, extends loans to both exporters and importers operating within the Andean
Pact countries.23 A connected institution, the Mechanism for the Confirmation of
Letters of Credit and Import Financing, was subsequently established to confirm
letters of credit and finance the importation of primary, intermediate, or capital
goods imported from outside the Andean Pact but intended for industries within
21. See Andean Group: Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement,
May 28, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1203; Andean Group: Commission Decision on the Statute of the
Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, May 19, 1983, 23 I.L.M. 422 (1984). An Andean
Parliament was also established at about this time made up of representatives from each of the
national legislatures of the member states, but its role, to date, has been consultative and almost
negligible with respect to its impact on actual decision making within the Andean Pact.
22. For a more detailed discussion of the Tribunal's powers and how it has actually functioned
over the years, see F. URIBE RESTREPO, EL DERECHO DE LA INTEGRAcI6N EN EL GRuPO ANDINO
(1990).
23. In addition to the five Andean countries, Chile, Mexico, Trinidad, and Tobago are also
currently members of the CAF and, therefore, are eligible for SAFICO financing. In addition, because
all five Andean Pact countries remain members of ALADI, they may also participate in the central
clearing house mechanism run through the Central Reserve Bank of Peru whereby member states
need use hard currency on intra-ALADI trade only to cancel outstanding debits existing at the end
of each four-month period.
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the Pact. In 1976 the Andean Reserve Fund, headquartered in BogotA, Colombia,
was formed to extend credit and guarantee loans to member states with balance
of payment problems and contribute to the harmonization of monetary, exchange,
and finance policies among the member states. The Andean Reserve Fund was
replaced by the Latin American Reserve Fund in 1991 when access was opened
up to all ALADI member countries.
H. The Unraveling of the Andean Pact
The first years of the Andean Pact's existence saw intraregional trade increase
from $143 million in 1969 to $213 million by 1974, with the regional trade
favoring mostly manufactured products. 24 The Andean countries also succeeded
in drafting three sectoral industrial development projects in metal working, steel,
petrochemicals, and automobile manufacturing, although only portions of the
metal working and petrochemical projects were actually ever implemented.25 A
minimal CET was also instituted by Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela by December
31, 1975.26 In 1976 the Andean Pact experienced its first visible crisis when Chile
withdrew over continued opposition to Decision 24 and the Pinochet dictatorship's
decision to pursue aggressive free market style economic policies that clashed
with the generally protectionist, state-led industrial development philosophy of
the Andean Pact scheme. More problems soon followed when the remaining
member states, bowing to domestic pressure groups unhappy with the differences
in short-term costs and benefits flowing from the integration process, failed to
observe or incorporate into national law all the provisions of the Cartagena
Agreement." Furthermore, unresolved political and territorial disputes between
the member states, particularly the armed conflict between Peru and Ecuador in
1977, compounded the difficulty of getting the member states to cooperate in
coordinating agricultural and industrial development policies and harmonizing
their asymmetrical domestic legal norms. 2' The final blow to the Andean Pact
24. Mace, Regional Integration in Latin America:A Long and Winding Road, 43 INT'L J. 404,
417 (Summer 1988).
25. CEPAL (Unidad de Comercio Internacional), DESENVOLVIMIENTO DE LOS PROCESOS DE
INTEGRACI6N EN AMIkRICA LATINA 49 (1995).
26. JUNTA DEL ACUERDO, MECANISMOS DE LA INTEGRACi6N ANDINA 38 (1985). This Minimal
Common External Tariff had an average duty of 27. 1% and a spread of 36.2%. Garay, The Prospects
for Andean Integration, in PROSPECTS FOR THE PROCESSES OF SUB-REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN CEN-
TRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA 69 (1992).
27. Vargas-Hidalgo, The Crisis of the Andean Pact: Lessons for Integration Among Developing
Countries, 17 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 213, 219 (1979).
28. Salgado Pefiaherrera, The Andean Pact: Problems and Perspectives, in REGIONAL INTEGRA-
TION: THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 175 (1985). Ironically, the problem of unresolved territorial
disputes surfaced again on January 27, 1995, when Peru and Ecuador went to war over territory
each claims as its own in the Amazon jungle. This war seriously disrupted trade flows among the
Andean countries for several months and threatened to undermine the entire Andean integration
process. See, e.g., Patti Lane, Peru-Ecuador Conflict Slows Andean Pact Trade Reforms, J. COM.,
Apr. 12, 1995, at IA.
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that caused the whole process to begin unraveling was the oil shock of 1979, which
affected members differently and led them to pursue conflicting macroeconomic
policies. 29 In particular, the sharp rise in oil prices caused some of the Andean
countries to face severe balance of payments problems. These problems developed
as more money went out to pay for petroleum and less money came in from
commodity exports, the prices of which also dropped due to a prolonged recession
that began affecting the industrialized countries in 1980. In an attempt to increase
exports and therefore expand their foreign currency exchanges, these Andean
countries sharply devalued their currencies. In doing so, they made imports from
oil-producing Ecuador and Venezuela, who were enjoying minibooms from the
sharp hike in oil prices (which, in turn, contributed to an overvaluation of their
currencies), more expensive and reimposed an indirect tariff barrier on Ecuador-
ean and Venezuelan goods. For their part, Venezuela and Ecuador became
swamped with the cheap manufactured goods of their Andean neighbors, and
industrialists in both countries quickly put pressure on their respective govern-
ments to impose safeguard clauses to halt the import tide that threatened to bank-
rupt them. The sharp rise in international interest rates in 1982, which set off
the infamous Latin American debt crisis and resulted in a subsequent halt in
international lending to Latin America, only exacerbated the problem by making
it impossible to "fund" the trade imbalances and drained the Andean institutional
bodies (the CAF and the Andean Reserve Fund) of the capital that had been
intended to alleviate trade imbalance problems. Consequently, whereas during
the first ten years of the Andean Pact's existence intraregional trade had grown
at an average annual rate of 28.2 percent, after 1979 there was virtually no
increase, and by 1983 trade within the Andean subregion was actually showing
signs of severe contraction.
30
IV. The First Attempts at Reform
By the early 1980s it had become apparent that the Andean Pact integration
process was dead as new, export-led policies were adopted by many of the member
states. The intent of these policies was to escape the limitations on state-directed
economic growth posed by the Latin American debt crisis that had seriously
disrupted intraregional trade flows and caused the deadlines for establishing a
subregional free trade area and a CET to go unmet. In an attempt to revitalize
the integration process, the Andean Pact members signed the Quito Protocol
29. The first oil shock of 1973-74 did not produce the same negative effects, because it coincided
with a price increase in traditional primary product exports of the Andean states and resulted in only
a short-lived recession in the industrialized nations, and petro-dollars soon made themselves available
at cheap interest rates to "subsidize" any trade imbalances. ALIiEDo FUENTES & JAVIER VIL-
LANUEVA, ECONOMfA MUNDIAL E INTEGRACI6N DE AMERICA LATINA 124-25 (1989).
30. Pefiaherrera, supra note 28, at 178.
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in May of 1987. 31 The Quito Protocol eliminated the strict time deadlines for
establishing an Andean free trade area and a CET; abolished the industrial devel-
opment programs and replaced them with efforts that placed the initiative for
integration with the private sector; and encouraged member states to reach bilat-
eral (as opposed to more complicated multilateral) accords to reduce tariff barriers
and eliminated import restrictions. In conjunction with the adoption of the Quito
Protocol, the Commission also repealed the controversial and counterproductive
Decision 24 and substituted it with Decision 220. Decision 220, in turn, lifted
prohibitions on foreigners purchasing stock in Andean companies and eliminated
restrictions on repatriation of remittances of earnings. 32
However, the changes introduced by the Quito Protocol ultimately proved
incapable of reviving the Andean economic integration process. For a revival
to occur, it would take a reformulation of the entire philosophical underpinnings
of the Andean Pact coupled with the adoption of free market-oriented economic
policies by all the member states. These events did not begin until the start of
the 1990s.
V. The Revival of the Andean Pact
Between May of 1989 and December of 1991 the presidents of the Andean
Pact countries met on six separate occasions in an attempt to revive the Andean
Pact integration process. All but one of these meetings were followed by important
announcements that made it clear that the Andean Pact was making a definitive
break with a past defined by heavily protected markets and inward-looking,
centrally planned economies to a future where market forces and export-led
growth would dominate.3 3 At the fifth of these meetings, held in Caracas in May
of 1991, the Andean presidents agreed to establish an intraregional free trade
area by January 1, 1992.3 At the sixth meeting, held in Cartagena in December
of 1991, a four-tiered CET of 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, and 20 percent
was announced that would be implemented by January 1, 1992 (with Bolivia
permitted to maintain its two-tiered 5 percent and 10 percent external tariff sys-
tem). In addition, any special lists of goods temporarily exempt from the CET
had to be abolished by January 1, 1993 (with Ecuador being given an additional
31. Andean Pact: Official Codified Text of the Cartagena Agreement Incorporating the Quito
Protocol, May 12, 1987, 28 I.L.M. 1165 (1989).
32. Andean Group: Commission Decision 220 Replacing Decision 24, the Common Foreign
Investment and Technology Licensing Code, entered into force May 24, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 974. One
thing that Decision 220 did not do, however, is eliminate the requirement that at least 51% of the
shares of a company had to be owned by Andean nationals before it could partake in the intraregional
free trade scheme.
33. These six presidential summit meetings included Cartagena, Colombia (May 1989), the
Galapagos Islands (December 1989), Machu-Picchu, Peru (May 1990), La Paz, Bolivia (November
1990), Caracas, Venezuela (May 1991), and Cartagena, Colombia (December 1991).
34. See Graham, Andean Nations Put Common Back Into Market, FIN. TIMES, May 30, 1991,
at 4.
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year to comply).35 In conjunction with the announcements emanating from the
various presidential summits, the Andean Commission also began issuing deci-
sions reflective of the deregulated and market-oriented direction of the new An-
dean Pact. In March of 1991, for example, the Commission adopted Decision
291, which superseded earlier decisions regarding foreign investment. Hence-
forth, there would, in principle, be no legal difference between foreign or domestic
capital. Foreigners were generally free to repatriate investment capital and profits
at will; any requirements of prior authorization or registration of foreign invest-
ments were abolished; and all foreign companies operating in the region (regard-
less of the percentage of Andean stockholders) could partake of the intraregional
free trade scheme.36
Despite the best intentions of the Andean presidents to have an intraregional
free trade area in place by January 1, 1992, and a fully functioning customs
union by 1995, differences among the member states soon emerged that disrupted
the implementation timetable. In April of 1992 Peru's membership in the Andean
Pact was temporarily suspended following President Alberto Fujimori's abroga-
tion of the Constitution, closing of the courts, and dissolution of Congress. Ecua-
dor resisted opening its entire market to intraregional free trade until 1993 and
did not adopt the CET until 1994 (and only then with significant modifications).
Isolated at the southern end of the Andean Pact, Bolivia focused its attentions
on seeking admission into the MERCOSUR with whom it conducts more trade
than with its fellow Andean Pact member states. Only Colombia and Venezuela
came close to meeting the deadlines for implementation of the intraregional free
trade area and the CET.
VI. The Andean Intraregional Free Trade Scheme Today
At the present time no duties are charged on goods native to, and traded among,
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In theory, nontariff barriers have
also been eliminated among the four countries, although recent actions by Colom-
bia and Venezuela indicate that this is still not always the case in practice.37
The one Andean Pact country that currently does not fully participate in the
intraregional free trade scheme is Peru. Although the political dilemma that was
35. CEPAL, supra note 25, at 55.
36. Andean Group: Commission Decision 291-Common Code for the Treatment of Foreign
Capital and on Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, Mar. 21, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1283. The
only significant requirements that Decision 291 retained from the previous legal regime for foreign
investment was the registration of technology licenses and a prohibition that such licenses contain
restrictions on the export of the goods manufactured under them.
37. See Patti Lane, Colombia Places Restrictions on Venezuelan Foodstuffs, J. COM., May 19,
1995, at 5A. In May 1995, Colombia prohibited rice imports from Venezuela and imposed counter-
vailing duties on Venezuelan corn and sugar imports. Colombia claimed that Venezuelan middlemen
were importing these items from abroad at well below the Andean Pact's CET and were then selling
them in Colombia, threatening to put local producers out of business.
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responsible for Peru's suspension from the Andean Pact in 1992 was resolved
in May of 1995 following Fujimori's reelection in democratic elections, Peru's
adoption of bold market-oriented, neoliberal economic policies make it difficult
for the country to participate fully in the Andean Pact when Peru's partners have
been much slower in adopting these same policies. Peru does, however, enjoy
tariff-free commerce with its four Andean Pact partners for all goods not levied
15 percent or 20 percent tariffs under the Andean CET regime (see below).
Goods that are levied the 15 percent to 20 percent tariffs (and are therefore
generally excluded from free trade), include meat, poultry, fish and lactates,
agricultural products, textiles, and paper goods. However, Peru also has separate
bilateral free trade agreements with all four of its fellow Andean Pact countries
under the auspices of ALADI and, therefore, some of the goods with 15 percent
or 20 percent tariffs under the Andean CET are traded by Peru with the other
countries tariff-free. In the Peruvian-Bolivian agreement, in fact, there is now
complete free trade between the two countries for almost all products. Negotia-
tions to incorporate Peru fully into the Andean Pact intraregional free trade scheme
are expected to be completed sometime in 1996.
In order to take advantage of the intraAndean free trade system, a product
must comply with the requisite rules of origin requirements of the Andean Pact.
The rules of origin requirements for the Andean Pact are governed by Decision
293 and are patterned on ALADI Resolution 78.38 In general, only goods that
are native to the Andean countries, or are substantially transformed within the
region so as to undergo a change in tariff classification, can be traded among
the Andean Pact countries duty free. However, goods whose extraregional content
does not exceed 50 percent of the final product's FOB (freight on board) price
will also generally be accorded intraregional free trade treatment. In the case of
goods made in Bolivia and Ecuador, the minimal regional content requirement
can be 60 percent.
VII. The Andean Common External Tariff System
The Andean Pact's CET consists of a four-tiered system. Since February 1,
1995, the majority of goods imported into Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela
are charged Andean tariffs of either 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, or 20
percent. Bolivia is specifically exempted from this four-tiered system by Andean
Pact Decision 370 and is allowed to retain its two-tiered system of 5 percent and
10 percent. Currently, Peru does not participate in the Andean CET system and
levels its own two-tiered external tariff regime of 15 percent and 25 percent. In
addition to the fact that neither Bolivia nor Peru adheres to the Andean Pact
CET, there are also a number of important exceptions applied by the three member
38. Andean Group: Commission Decision 293-Special Norms for Determining the Origin of
Goods, Mar 21, 1991, 32 I.L.M. 172.
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states that theoretically adhere to it in full. Most of these exceptions will be
gradually phased out over the next four years so as to comply with the general
four-tiered system.
The most important exception to the Andean Pact's four-tiered CET system
is the option given to Ecuador to keep its tariffs for some 960 items five percentage
points either above or below its obligations under the CET. These goods are
listed in Annex 2 to Decision 370 and primarily consist of agricultural, chemical,
pharmaceutical, and steel products, as well as certain types of machinery. Another
important exception to the CET is the 0 percent tariff that each Andean Pact
country may charge on capital good imports as well as mutually agreed upon
primary goods not produced in the region. Yet another important exception exists
for automobiles, for which Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela currently levy
a 40 percent tariff until a definitive regime for the automobile industry can be
established. The three countries, however, charge a 5 percent tariff on disassem-
bled automobiles and motorcycles imported into the Andean Pact that are put
together in regional factories. Finally, the Andean Pact also maintains a variable
tariff system (Decision 371) for certain basic agricultural goods for which there
are often wide fluctuations in price on the international market. Under this mecha-
nism, when the price of, for example, winter wheat falls below the average
international market price as measured over the preceding five years, the Andean
countries will impose an additional duty in order to bring the price up to the
so-called historical range. This mechanism is designed to give Andean producers
some level of predictability for making adequate production decisions and escape
volatile swings in input costs or final products prices.
VIII. The Legal Regime for the Protection of Intellectual Property
The current legal norms for the protection of intellectual property rights in all
five Andean Pact countries are found in three decisions issued by the Commission.
Because the Commission has supranational authority, its decisions should auto-
matically become the law in each of the five member states upon their publication
in the Gaceta Oficial delAcuerdo de Cartagena (unless the decision itself provides
for a later date). In the event of conflicting or pre-existing domestic law, Andean
community law theoretically takes precedence without the need to resort to the
national legislatures for enabling or corrective legislation. In actual practice,
however, there have often been delays in the full implementation of decisions
of the Andean Commission, and the area of intellectual property norms has been
no exception.
Decision 344 contains the rules for the protection of patents, utility models,
trademarks, industrial secrets, and so-called place of origin denominations.39
39. For the full text of Decision 344 in the original Spanish, see Decisi6n 344: Rdgimen Comtin
Sobre Propiedad Industrial, Oct. 29, 1993, 10 GACETA OFICIAL DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA 142.
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Patents are protected for twenty years, including patents for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts (as long as they do not appear in the list of essential medicines maintained
by the World Health Organization) and biotechnology inventions. The protection
offered to patent holders in the Andean Pact is actually greater than that which
exists in some of the individual MERCOSUR countries (since there are, as yet,
no MERCOSUR norms). For example, Argentina has yet to amend its patent
law so as to protect pharmaceuticals until after the year 2000. As for trademarks,
Andean Pact Decision 344 affords an initial ten-year period of protection, which
can subsequently be renewed.
Decision 351 contains the rules governing copyright and related protection for
books, records, movies, computer software, and other forms of literary, artistic,
and scientific works (including radio, television, and audiographic productions).40
Unlike Decision 344, Decision 351 offers so-called pipeline protection to copy-
right holders. Protection of copyrights is offered for the life of the author plus
an additional fifty years following the author's death.
Decision 345 is a particularly innovative addition to the realm of intellectual
property protections available in the Andean countries. 41 Any person who has
created or otherwise obtained a new plant variety through scientific research will
enjoy the exclusive right to produce and commercialize such plant for a period
of fifteen to twenty-five years.
The area where the delays have come in implementing Decisions 344, 351,
and 345 has been in the establishment of regulatory bodies and procedures in
each Andean country for the effective and adequate enforcement of the rights
granted protection. Traditionally, this has been a serious problem in the Andean
countries whose judicial systems tend to be overwhelmed with heavy case loads,
are understaffed, and are severely underfunded. In such an atmosphere, the possi-
bilities for petty corruption to flourish are rampant. One solution that many of
the Andean countries have adopted is to set up independent administrative agencies
as alternatives to the local courts. These administrative bodies provide quick
resolutions of copyright or trademark infringement complaints as well as allega-
tions of pirating of intellectual property rights. In Peru, for example, the adminis-
trative agency charged with enforcing Decisions 344, 345, and 351 is INDECOPI
(Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protecci6n de la Propie-
dad Intelectual).
At the present time, all countries in the Andean Pact apply Decision 344,
although a matter is currently before the Venezuelan Supreme Court challenging
the constitutionality of Decision 344 in Venezuela. To date, only Colombia and
40. For the full text of Decision 351 in the original Spanish, see Decisi6n 351: Rdgimen Comtin
Sobre Derechos de Autor y Derechos Conexos, Dec. 21, 1993, 10 GACETA OFICIAL DEL ACUERDO
DE CARTAGENA 145.
41. For the full text of Decision 345 in the original Spanish, see Decisi6n 345: R6gimen Comtin
de Protecci6n a los Obtentores de Variedades Vegetales, Oct. 29, 1993, 10 GACETA OFICIAL DEL
ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA 142.
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Ecuador have set up the registration process mandated by Decision 345. Although
Decision 345 is technically valid law in the other Andean Pact countries, it is
without practical effect until these countries establish the requisite registration
procedures.
IX. Recent Proposals for Institutional Reform
One of the things that sets the Andean Pact apart from other regional economic
integration programs in Latin America is the existence of well-developed commu-
nitarian institutions with supranational authority. This scenario contrasts with
the situation that exists in the MERCOSUR, for example, where the institutional
structure is weak and any decisions or resolutions adopted by the respective
governing bodies must first be implemented into the domestic law of each member
41
state before they become effective in the respective countries.
One of the specific proposals for institutional reforms adopted by the five
Andean Pact presidents in Quito last September is the restructuring of the Junta
del Acuerdo de Cartagena into a General Secretariat under the leadership of a
secretary general. With this change it is hoped that some of the impasses created
in the past when the three-member junta was unable to reach unanimous agreement
on how to implement the decisions of the Andean Commission can be avoided.
In addition, the highest political decision-making body of the Andean Pact will
now be the Council of Andean Presidents and not the Commission (although the
latter retains its powers to issue decisions involving integration matters that have
direct applicability in the legal systems of the member states). Also, the Council
of Andean Ministers of Foreign Relations will be expanded so as to include the
respective Ministers of Industry, Commerce, and/or Integration of the respective
member states. This Council will also be entrusted with authority to negotiate
treaties and agreements with other countries and international organizations.
Regarding the Andean Pact's Tribunal of Justice, proposals will be voted on
in 1996 which will, inter alia, give individuals the right to sue a member state
for noncompliance of Andean Pact norms and will also permit the Tribunal to
serve as an arbitration panel for business disputes involving private parties.43 In
recent years the Tribunal has gained increased importance as a result of the
greater emphasis given within the Andean Pact to the protection and enforcement
of intellectual property rights. In 1995 the court's case load increased five times
42. This situation no longer appears to be the case in Argentina as a result of amendments
made to its Constitution in 1994 and recent Supreme Court holdings interpreting those amendments.
Accordingly, most norms flowing out of bodies created by international treaties (such as the Treaty
of Asuncion, which created MERCOSUR) have direct applicability in Argentina and, theoretically,
even take precedence over conflicting domestic legislation.
43. TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICIA DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA, PROYECTO DE REFORMAS ALTRATADO
DEL TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICIA DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA (1995).
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from the year before and approximately 90 percent of the court's present case
load deals with actions involving interpretation of intellectual property norms."
X. Conclusion
Once derided as the worst manifestation of protectionist, import-substitution
economic policies and blamed for creating an economically stagnant Latin
America, the Andean Pact has in recent years been at the forefront of efforts to
establish uniform rules that encourage free trade and attract foreign investment.
Because of a preexisting network of communitarian institutions enjoying suprana-
tional authority, the Andean Pact has been much more successful in establishing
uniform norms for the protection of foreign direct investment and intellectual
property rights than have other Latin American integration projects. These institu-
tions are currently being reformed in an effort to make them more effective as
well as more compatible with the new market-oriented economic policies that
now predominate in the Andean countries.
44. Luis Henrique Farfas Mata, President of the Tribunal of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement,
Address at the 32d Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association in Quito, Ecuador (Programa
Especial del Tribunal de Justicia del Acuerdo de Cartagena) (Nov. 14, 1995).
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